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THE NONPROFIT HEALTH CARE
CORPORATlON REFORM ACT OF
1980*

David L. Hollister**
Patience A. Drake***

Blue Cross/Blue Shield (the "Blues") was created as a taxexempt, "charitable and benevolent" organization1 by specific
enabling legislation, Michigan Public Acts 108 and 109 of 1939.
It was designed to assure that poor folks received health care
and, more importantly at that time, that physicians and hospitals got paid. The Blues, with its unique tax-free and semi-public status, quietly became the predominant third party payor
health insurer in Michigan. In 1980, they represented a $2.35
billion dollar business and, in addition, processed $1.45 billion
dollars for the Federal Medicare program. They insured 5.3 million Michigan residents (over sixty percent of the market) and,
because of their size and control of the market, dictated health
policy in this state.
In recent years, Blue Cross/Blue Shield has been the subject
of considerable controversy. Its critics charge the non-profit, taxexempt corporation with being unduly secretive, arrogantly unresponsive to consumer interest and not vigorous in its cost containment efforts. These criticisms, along with a variety of other
factors, led to the legislative refomi I am here to talk to you
about this evening.

• This is a revised version of a speech delivered at the Journal of Law Reform Alumni
Banquet, February 21, 1981, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

** Michigan State Representative, 57th District; a recipient of the first annual University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Award.
** • Health Care Legislative Analyst, Michigan House Democratic Research Staff.
1939 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 108 (repealed 1980). MICH. CoMP. LAws § 550.315 (1970)
(repealed 1980) defines the Blues as a "charitable and benevolent institution" and grants
it tax-exempt status.
·
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THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

A.

Background

Health care costs have increased from 6.2 percent of the Gross
National Product in 1965 to 9.1 percent in 1978. The rate of
growth of health care expenditures is twice the Consumer Price
Index, and Michigan's costs are among the highest in the nation.
These cost spirals are a function of the premise that the health
care industry does not respond to traditional market incentives.
Health care is removed from the market because the providers
control the demand and utilization of facilities, drugs, and other
services. Generally, consumers are ignorant of the range of
health services, have no comparative price information, and usually seek out services when they are ill or in crisis and unable to
evaluate and judge the services rendered by health care professionals. Health care providers, having escaped the competitive
marketplace, have been reimbursed on a cost-plus basis. There
are, therefore, no incentives to contain costs. With over ninety
percent of all Michigan health care expenses covered by third
party payors, 1 neither the physician nor the consumer have any
out-of-pocket economic incentive to economize. As costs escalate
at faster and faster rates, those without insurance are forced out
of the health care market.
It was with this in mind that Representative Perry Bullard
and I first introduced legislation in 1977. Representative Builard's bill was a major restructuring of Blue Cross/Blue Shield,
while my bills8 would have required that the Blues Board conform to the Open Meetings Act.• While none of these bills
moved in that session of the Legislature, significant public interest was stimulated. A consensus was developing that the 1939
statutes needed major revision.
In an October 1978 ruling, the Michigan Supreme Court in
Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan v. Demlow5 ruled that the
• Hospital, surgical, regular medical, and major medical insurance covered 93.9%,
94.5%, 96.5%, and 68.6% of the Michigan population, respectively. Nationally, the respective percentages were 82.5%, 79.8%, and 77.5% with major medical data unavailable. These estimates are based on 1974 data of persons under 65 covered by private
insurance. MICHIGAN STATE HEALTH PLANNING ADVISORY COUNCIL & OFFICE OF HEALTH
AND MEDICAL AFFAIRS, NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE 59 (1977).
• H.R. 5450, 79th Sess. (Mich. 1977) (Bullard); H.R. 5295, 79th Sess. (Mich. 1977);
H.R. 5296, 79th Sess. (Mich. 1977) (Hollister).
• MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 15.261-.275 (Supp. 1980).
• 403 Mich. 399, 270 N.W.2d 845 (1978).
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Insurance Commissioner had differing degrees of control over
Blue Cross and Blue Shield even though the two distinct programs had been organizationally consolidated through legislation
in 1974. The Blues management was not opposed to legislation.
In the spring of 1979, the Blues management came to Representative William Ryan and me requesting us to introduce their
version of a rewrite of P.A. 108 & 109.• Representative Ryan
sponsored and I co-sponsored a bill7 which, upon introduction,
was referred to the House Insurance Committee for consideration. During the first hearing, the committee room was packed
with groups insisting that the legislature reject the incremental,
patchwork approach contained in the Blues draft and work instead to reform and reorganize fundamentally the Blues. It became apparent that the restructuring of the Blues and the initiation of cost containment were to become the major consumer
issues to face the 79th Session of the Michigan Legislature.
It was clear that the Blues proposal to address minimal, incremental reform was dead. Within days after the first Insurance
Committee hearing, the Insurance Commissioner, the Attorney
General and the Citizens Lobby came forward with different
versions of legislation fundamentally reorganizing Blue Cross/
Blue Shield. Representative Ryan and I co-sponsored all of the
proposals, and began the process of building the public support
necessary to enact the legislation. We agreed to use the Attorney
General's draft as the vehicle bill8 to address the issues raised in
the committee meeting and at hearings with various interest
groups.

B.

The Major Goals of the Legislation

As we began to refine the legislation, it was important to articulate the basic goals of any reform legislation. Based on my
knowledge of the Blues and the testimony from the first hearing,
it was apparent that legislation would have to achieve at least
the following goals. First, the legislation would have to restructure the Board of Directors in order to make the Board more
representative of and accountable to the various constituencies.
One way to do this, it seemed, would be to reduce the control of
• 1939 Mich. Pub. Acts Nos. 108-09 (repealed 1980). Public Act 109 provides the
framework for supervision and regulation of nonprofit hospital service corporations in
Michigan.
• H.R. 4340, 79th Sees. (Mich. 1979).
• H.R. 4555, 79th Sees. (Mich. 19_79).
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the providers and give operational control to subscribers, malcing a representative selection of the Board more open. Another
step would be to reduce the size of the Board and provide minimum safeguards for conduct of Board operations. Second, the
legislation would have to make cost containment a central
theme. Third, the internal operations of the Blues would have to
be streamlined. The 1939 statute needed to be updated to reflect
the realities of 1980, and to remedy the administrative problems
raised by Demlow.9 Overall, the internal operations of the Blues
would have to be more responsive and sensitive to subscribers.
As a final goal of the legislation, the power of the Insurance
Commissioner would have to be clarified.
C.

The Politics of Reform

Most bills of the complexity involved here talce five to seven
years to shepard through the legislative process. To do this in
one session - two years - was i major challenge. It required
establishing a broad-based coalition of interest groups, consumers and agencies of state government. To organize and undertalce
the task, Insurance Committee Chair Matthew McNeely established a three-member subcommittee in the spring of 1978, of
which I was an ad-hoc member. At approximately the same
time, two different coalitions coalesced as work began on the
bill. The first was known as the "Reform Coalition." The Reform Coalition was composed of consumer groups (Michigan
Legal Services, Citizens for Better Care, the UAW, AFL-CIO,
Michigan Citizens Lobby, Michigan Catholic Conference, and
the Area Agencies on Aging Association) and state departments
(Attorney General, Insurance Commissioner, Office of Health
and Medical Affairs).
The Reform Coalition, at the direction of the subcommittee,
worked during the summer -to synthesize the four consumeroriented bills into one and to resolve and minimize differences
with representatives from the Blues. In August, the Reform Coalition presented their rough draft, House Bill 4555, 'to the
subcommittee.
The subcommittee began intensive deliberations on the bill.
The Reform coalition sent representatives to all subcommittee
meetings in the House where the bill was laboriously reworked
one line and one page at a time. Together, with input from sev• 403 Mich. 399, 270 N.W.2d 845 (1978).
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eral Blues management representatives, the Coalition worked to
develop a comprehensive reform bill that was fair to Blue Cross/
Blue Shield. As the Coalition members participated in the drafting, they also developed "ownership" of the bill by becoming actively involved in the legislative process to pass the bill.
The second group was known as the "Shelton Coalition."
While the Reform Coalition was spending months working to
clarify language and refine policy, the Speaker asked Jack
Shelton of Ford Motor Company to reconvene the Cost Containment Coalition and tackle the linchpin of language and policy,
the method and level of reimbursement to providers by the
Blues. This Coalition was made up of the Big Three Auto Companies (General Motors, Ford, Chrysler), the UAW and AFLCIO, and members of Blue Cross/ Blue Shield of Michigan
(BCBSM). Contributing as technical advisors, but not voting
participants, were members of the Medical Society and Hospital
Association. Jack Shelton worked diligently to separate his task
- a cost containment scheme - from t~e rest of the bill. The
final product, Section V, stood independently from the rest of
the bill and consequently avoided the controversy involved in
the Board restructuring and corporate powers sections. Shelton
formulated a unique compromise designed to allow the free mar~
ket place to work while allowing governmental intervention if
the Blues and the providers failed to achieve their goals regarding access to reasonably priced, quality care.
When Shelton completed his work, he elicited and obtained
the support of the Medical Society, the Hospital Association,
and the Nurses Association for Section V - the only section
that they were really interested in. They became advocates for
the reform, a very important accomplishment. With all the providers supporting Section V and staying neutral on the rest of
the bill, the Blues had no major interest group to turn to as they
tried to stop passage of the legislation.
Slowly and deliberately, we went through the drafting of the
bill. An early summer deadline faded to early fall. Finally, the
bill began to take shape. Section by section of the bill fell into
place as the coalition labored to negotiate a final and equitable
version. The Blues tried to delay. They continuously raised issues and questions, never attending a meeting without eight to
fourteen experts and staff.
When the House Insurance Committee received the subcommittee's work and prepared to report the bill to .the full House,
the Blues asked that over eighty amendments be considered. All
of the amendments failed. The bill had been thoughtfully devel-
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oped and the various coalition members were informed and actively supporting the negotiated version. To have adopted the
amendments would have been a betrayal of the process and the
coalition's efforts to construct the bill. The bill quickly moved
from the Insurance Committee to the full House where it passed
by a vote of ninety-five to seven. It then moved to the Senate for
deliberation.
In the Senate, the Blues focused their opposition to the Board
restructuring issues, and worked to break the coalition that had
supported the bill in the House. Quietly and secretly, they went
to every member of the Reform Coalition and the special interests (Medical Society, Hospital Association), talking with them
about the issues they lost in the year-long negotiations. Having
identified those losses, the Blues drafted a version of the bill
that would more accurately reflect their interest and that was
designed to "buy". the support of others. The Blues had three
objectives: (1) to make the bill more palatable; (2) to break the
powerful coalition which had drafted and lobbied for the House
versio~ of the bill; and (3) to dilute the reform contained in the
bill to make it the least progressive possible.
Unfortunately, they were successful. In a move which astounded most observors, they were able to garner the votes in
the Commerce Committee to have their own draft replace the
House draft on which the Commerce Committee had deliberated
for several months. The sixty-plus-page Blues-drafted version
was adopted at one meeting despite the fact that several committee members had not even been given the opportunity to
read the Blues' draft before voting. Thus, the Senate began consideration on the Blues' draft. It appeared that all the work in
the House was lost. The coalition was broken; the Blues were in
the driver's seat. Attempts to modify incrementally the bill in
Committee and on the Senate floor were moderately successful,
but the bill remained a far different version than the consumeroriented bill that passed the House: After several days of floor
debate, during which over forty amendments were vociferously
disputed, the Senate passed the bill on July 3, 1980, with a vote
of twenty-six to nine. ·
When the bill returned to the House, we rejected it immediately by a vote of seventy-seven to five and sent it to a Conference Committee. Before the Conference were two distinct versions of reform - one written by a consumer coalition in an
open, deliberate process, and another written by the entity to be
regulated, the Blues, after secretive meetings with various elements of the coalition. The Conference lasted four months and
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the final draft was somewhere between the House and Senate
version. Surprisingly, however, the Blues were still not supporting the bill because they had not been able to win the Board
restructuring issues. The absolute bottom line always was management control of the Board; we continuously won that battle.
Slowly we rebuilt the coalition, and slowly the bill came back
together. The Conference Committee completed its reconciliation of the disparate bills and reported it to the House for consideration, where it was adopted on December 4, 1980. The next
day the bill passed the Senate and was sent to the Governor for
his signature. On December 29, 1980, the Governor signed the
bill, making it Public Act No. 350. 10
II. P.A. 350 A.

ESSENTIALS OF REFORM

Board Structure

First, P.A. 350, the "Nonprofit Health Care Corporation Reform Act" (the "Act") reorganizes the Board of Directors to no
more than thirty-five voting members, 11 a reduction from fortyseven members. Four of the directors would be public members,
two of whom would be retirees. UI Of the remainder, at least seventy-five percent must be subscribers and no more than twentyfive percent could be providers. 18 (The Blues Board at present
has forty-seven members: twenty-five subscriber representatives,
nineteen provider members, two public members appointed by
the Insurance Commissioner, and the President of the Corporation. However, because some of the twenty-five subscribers also
have health care provider ties, such as a trustee of a hospital,
many groups have argued that Board members with provider allegiance currently hold majority control.)
Under the Act, the Board is reorganized to represent more
fairly various constituencies - providers and subscribers; group
and individual subscribers; large, medium, and small groups;
and employers and employees. The actual selection process is
not dictated by the Act, but is left to the Blue Cross bylaws14 ·
•• 1980 Mich. Pub. Act.a No. 350 (codified at Mice. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 550.1101.1704 (Mich. Legis. Serv. 1980)).
11
Id. § 301(1) (MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1301(1)).
11
Id. § 301(2) (Mice. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1301(2)).
11
Id. § 301(3) (Mice. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1301(3)).
" Id. § 301(6) (Mice. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1301(6)).
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which are to be written by the current Board of Directors. 111
Open meetings are not required, and certain sensitive material
need not be included in the minutes of the Board meetings.
The Act required that Board action have the support of the
majority of members serving (sixteen affirmative votes) on key
issues such as rate revisions and provider contr~cts. 18 The purposes of this provision are: (1) assure subscriber control; (2) require board action to have the genuine support of the Board; (3)
prevent a small minority from ·taking action opposed by the vast
majority; and (4) to protect against conflicts of interest when
providers must vote on their own methods and rates of
reimbursement.
The basic philosophy behind this section is that the Board
ought to be broadly representative and responsive to various
constituencies. Thus, subscribers ought to have a role in determining the actions and policies of Blue Cross. It is important to
note that, unlike private insurance companies which are accountable to their shareholders, Blue Cross is a non-profit corporation and does not have shareholders. Its accountability ought
to be predominately to its subscribers and, secondarily, to the
public.
The Act provides for this accountability. In addition to the
restructuring of the Board, it provides for Board action to be
open to subscriber scrutiny. It is proper and reasonable that
subscribers have the ability to know how their representatives
on the Board are voting on important items, and what decisions
the Board is making.
The Act does not, however, require open meetings. Unfortunately the Blues argued successfully that too much ope~ess
would put them at a competitive disadvantage and be harmful
in recruiting potential Board members. Instead of open meetings, the Board is required to keep minutes of its meetings. 17
Record roll call votes are required upon the request of any five
Board members. 18 Any subscriber can request minutes through a
Board member. 19
The Blues found this section of the Reform Act to be the most
dangerous and threatening. They agree with a smaller, subscriber-controlled Board but they violently oppose roll call votes,
recorded minutes, accountability to subscriber constituencies,
11

Id.
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
•• Id.
18

§ 302(1) (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1302(1)).
§ 303(4)(c) (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1303(4)(c)).
§ 304(1) (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1304(1)).
§ 303(5) (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1303(5)).
§ 304(1) (MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1304(1)).
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public members, and the absolute majority voting provisions.
Taken together, they allege that the provisions hamper their
operations and cripple the Board's ability to function.
To the Reform Coalition, this section was essential to any reform. Without some degree of openness and accountability, it is
business as usual. Any public body can decry openness, but it is
a fundamental component of accountability as are record roll
call votes. Even though complete openness and complete roll call
votes on all issues were lost in the negotiations on the bill, the
legislation maintains a major policy commitment to openness
and accountability.

B. Regulation and Cost Containment
When it came to cost containment, there were two diametrically opposing views which came into play. On one end of the
spectrum were those arguing for a state-controlled rate-setting
mechanism which simply dictated costs and initiated controls.
On the other end of the spectrum were those who advocate4 the
free marketplace, eliminating all governmental regulation and
letting the Blues and the providers figure ways to limit growth.
Months went by as the debate raged. Finally, Speaker Bobby
Crim asked Jack Shelton of the Cost Containment Coalition to
develop a strategy on cost containment. He had been successful
earlier in developing Michigan's Bed Reduction Legislation. The
final strategy developed by the Shelton Coalition was a creative
compromise encompassing both aspects_ of the diverse opinions.
First, the Act establishes three goals for health care: (1) reasonable access; (2) reasonable cost; and (3) quality health care
services. The cost goal is designed to assµre a rate of growth that
does not exceed the compound rate of inflation and real economic growth.
To achieve these three goals, the Blues negotiate a Provider
Class Plan with each of the provider groups (as defined by Blue
Cross/Blue Shield)-physicians, hospitals, pharmacies, et cetera.
The Plan must address access, quality, and cost containment.
The Plan is operable for two years, without governmental involvement or interference. ff after two years the goals are met,
the government continues to have a passive monitoring role and
the Blues negotiate a further plan or continue the existing plan.
The scheme here is simple. ff the Blues can successfully work
with the providers to meet their goals and limit the growth of
costs, the free market will go forward without governmental in-
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terference. If, on the other hand, the goals are not met, and one
of the goals is violated, the Insurance Commissioner triggers a
mechanism of review and rewriting of the Plan. Essentially, the
Plan calls for governmental intervention if the free market fails.
In the event the Plan fails, and for certain decisions which the
Commissioner may exercise, an elaborate appeal mechanism is
established to hear appeals.
It is true that Blue Cross has begun to progress towards containing costs, especially in the case of the prospective reimbursement system with hospitals. The Act gives Blue Cross additional
cost restraint powers. If they are able to achieve cost containment there will be no governmental involvement; this section
will result in less regulation than has historically been the case
for Blue Cross.
The Act substantially adopts the provisions of the Shelton Coalition. Every major provider group and consumer group has
supported this section. It was estimated that over $137 million
would have been saved if these provisions had been in effect the
past four years.
One legitimate criticism is that there will be cost containment
goals for Blue Cross, but not for private insurance companies. In
part, this is because Blue Cross has such a substantial share of
the market (over sixty-five percent) that it only makes sense
first to establish goals for Blue Cross. Furthermore, Blue Cross/
Blue Shield of Michigan is the only corporation to which the
Legislature has granted the privilege and authority to contract
directly with providers of health care. But in addition, this will
aid Blue Cross' competitive position - lower payments to providers means lower rates to subscribers; this could greatly benefit
Blue Cross.

C. Improving Internal Operations
Especially in the last ten to twelve years, significant questions
over the powers of Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Michigan have
arisen. Many of these questions have ended up in court resulting
in great expenditures of time, money, and energy. The Legislature felt it was important to define, as much as possible, exactly
what Blue Cross can and cannot do.so As a result, many provisions of corporate law are inserted directly in P.A. 350, and with
these provisions carry any case law developed over the years.
•

0

See id. § 207 (Mica. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1207).
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Other sections of corporate law had no applicability to Blue
Cross and were not included in the Act. But in virtually every
case where Blue Cross asked for and offered a rationale for including a section of corporate law in P.A. 350, it was included.
Rather than place a burden on Blue Cross, this should aid them
by reducing the number of court cases they are needlessly involved in.
The Act significantly increases the ability of Blue Cross/Blue
Shield of Michigan to offer their customers and subscribers services which they desire. Blue Cross is now given explicit power
in the areas of cost saving services, experimental health ·care
projects, governmental services, Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO), et cetera. In other areas, governmental regulation
is reduced or eliminated (e.g., some areas of provider contracts,
rate regulation, and reserves). This should add to Blue Cross'
flexibility and ability to respond to the market.
1. Rates- The Act revises the rate approval process for Blue
Cross. In some areas, the authority of the Insurance Commissioner is reduced from that of current law, in other areas current
law is clarified, and in a few areas, the authority of the Commissioner is increased. We believe that this area of P.A. 350 will
result in a better rate procedure-one resulting in more timely
rate approval. (One could hardly imagine a less timely process
than current law, which has allowed a 1978 filing to drag on
without an end in sight).
a. Intervention- The Act provides that upon receipt of a rate
filing, the Insurance Commissioner must notify "interested persons" of the filing. 11 If "the interested person or any other person on whose behalf the interested person is acting is aggrieved
by the proposed rate change," and if the Commissioner agrees
that the person is, in fact, aggrieved (or reasonably might be),
that person is entitled to a hearing. 11 The hearing procedure
parallels the Administrative Procedures Act. 18 The Legislature
received testimony that aggrieved persons have a constitutional
right to this kind of a procedure and that failure to provide this
kind of process in P.A. 350 would result in almost certain (and
undoubtedly, successful) legal challenge. There are standards for
intervention, and the procedure specified in the Act is orderly,
timely, and fair to both the aggrieved persons and Blue Cross. It
should also be noted that many areas are exempted from prior
•• Id. § 612 (MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1612).
Id. § 613 (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1613).

11

11

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 24.201 (1970).
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approval by the Commissioner (e.g. collective bargaining agreements,24 national accounts/111 mandated benefits26 ) - a regulatory reduction from current law.
b. Relationship to other private insurers- Individual commercial health insurance policies are subject to regulatory review
and approval for both the rates and the form (policy). Though
hearings on such policies are held infrequently, if a company or
affected party requested a hearing, it would be held. Similarly,
the Act does not mandate hearings; it provides a procedure for
holding hearings in the event that a hearing is requested. The
purpose of a hearing is not to provide "interminable delay" in
rate decisions, but to afford due process on rate decisions as outlined in the Administrative Procedures Act. When considering
the frequency with which hearings are held, one must bear in
mind the relationship with market share. For example, Blue
Cross provides Other-than-Group Complementary and Group
Complementary coverage (wrap-around Medicare benefits) to
over seventy percent of Michigan's seniors. When such a large
percent of the population is affected by one corporation, it is
reasonable to expect that parties will be interested in the outcome of rate decisions.
c. Interim relief- It is important to note that current law
does not provide for interim rates - under any circumstances!
The Act provides mandatory interim rate increases requested by
the Corporation in the case of a delay in a rate filing approval.17
This would happen when there is probable cause to believe that
an underwriting loss would occur without the interim relief.18
For the first time, interim rates are permitted.
d. Senior citizens' rates- The Act does permit (but does not
require) the Corporation to establish cost transfers to benefit senior citizen subscribers.19 This is important, because at retirement seniors suffer a drastic income reduction. Seniors have
paid their dues into our society and should be allowed to live the
rest of their .days without being in constant fear that illness
could wipe them out. In any event, P.A. 350 gives Blue Cross
authority in this area, without any requirements.
In summary, the Act provides for a reasonable and orderly
14
1980 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 350, § 606(2) (codified at MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §
550.1607(2) (Mich. Legis. Serv. 1980)).
.. Id. § 608(5) (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1608(5)).
08
Id. § 608(4) (MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1608(4)) .
.., Id. § 614(1) (MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1614(1)).
u Id. § 614(2) (MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1614(2)).
" Id. § 609(5) (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1609(5)).
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process for rate approval. There are provisions for intervention,
which is required by due process, and necessary to allow aggrieved parties to have an opportunity to present their case.
This procedure should result in fairer and more timely rates.
2. Benefits- The current statute provides for prior and periodic approval of benefits and rates by the Insurance Commissioner for all contracts involving both Blue Cross and any other
commerical health insurer. The Act reduces the Commissioner's
statutory authority in this area for the Blues, especially in the
case of collectively bargained agreements;80 however, historically,
Commissioners have not exercised this authority over collectively bargained benefits because of the operation of the informed buyer concept in the case of collectively bargained
benefits.
Benefits· and rates offered by commercial insurers are subject
to approval by the Commissioner. Though a 1968 order exempted group benefits from such approval, every individual
health insurance policy and rate is reviewed and approved by
the Commissioner.
A provision on comprehensiveness of benefits is included to
provide protection for the public. Many individuals and small
groups have no market power to influence the decisions of
BCBSM regarding benefit levels and accessibility. A case in
point is the decision by BCBSM to limit the offering of coverage
to the medicare eligible; this action was set aside by court order.
BCBSM does "not think they should be forced to offer any
benefits by law." The Legislature disagrees. Commercial insurers
are required to offer coverage for prosthetic devices as well as for
treatment for alcoholism and substance abuse. 81 In addition,
P.A. 350 merely requires Blue Cross to offer or include, at an
additional cost, prosthetic coverage so that those who wish to
purchase such additional coverage may. 81 This section on benefits actually reduces the authority of the Insurance
Commissioner!
3. Contingency reserves- Currently, the Insurance Commissioner has the right to regulate all reserves; reserves shall be
maintained "in such form and amount as the commissioner of
insurance may determine."88 Although unclear, it appears that
total BCBSM reserves equaled about $800 million as of Decemao Id. § 607(2) (MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1607(2)).
•• Id. § 414(1) (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1414(1)).
u Id. § 415 (MlcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1415).
u MlcH. CoMP. LAws § 550.509 (1970).
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her 31, 1978 (total premiums were $2.13 billion). The major item
of controversy is contingency reserves, which amounted to $275
million.
The Act spells out in great detail the level of contingency
reserves and how the various lines of business will .contribute to
them. 84 An initial target of 11.5 percent of income is set with a
range of seven to fourteen percent. 811 The reserves may fluctuate
within this range. However, when they exceed the fourteen percent, the Blues must make adjustments to bring them nearer the
target. 86 The target and range are permitted to shift over time as
the distribution of Blues business becomes more or less risky. In
addition, the portion of rates which is to be contributed toward
contingency reserves is clearly and equitably specified amongst
all lines of business.
It is important to note that current Blue Cross policy is to
target contingency reserves at 12.5 percent. This target was established in 1977, prior to implementation of an experience rating system which has subsequently reduced substantially the
risk assumed by the corporation, by providing for retrospective
premium adjustments for certain groups (over forty percent of
their business)!
There is a need for prudent contingency reserves, and P.A.
350 recognizes that need. But it also recognizes that these
reserves are funded by subscribers' money; thus excessive
reserves are inappropriate. Reserves are funded by, and belong
to, subscribers. Higher reserves mean higher premiums, which
may not be justified. Lower reserves can result in lower premiums, which should improve the competitive posture of Blue
Cross!
4. Investments- It is important to remember that since
BCBSM has no stockholders, money available for investment by
Blue Cross belongs to its subscribers. Thus, it is essential that
investments be prudent and safe. The investment section parallels that of domestic commercial life insurance companies, but
also allows up to two percent of assets to be invested in "venture capital" in Michigan-based operations. 87 With the "venture
capital" section, the Committee recognized the value of some
more risky investments both to the state's economy and to the
corporation in the form of increased yields for the corporation.
.. 1980 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 350, § 205 (codified at MlcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1205
(Mich. Legis. Serv. 1980)).
aa Id. § 205(9) (MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1205(9)) .

.. Id.
•• Id. § 206(3) (MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 550.1206(3)).
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Yet it is important that these more risky investments not be
large enough to result in a potential loss of a substantial portion
of reserves.
The Act would permit investments such as Trapper's Alley
and the Chrysler loan. P.A. 350's investment provisions are reasonable, workable, and flexible.
5. Safeguarding competitive data- Through the Freedom of
Information Act, 88 the Legislature has determined that all governmental records should be subject to public inspection unless
there is a compelling reason for their privacy. This Act contains
specific exemptions for the release of certain information (e.g.
trade secrets, personal information, etc., would be exempt from
disclosure), and any material filed by Blue Cross with the Insurance Commissioner would be subject to these exemptions. In addition, certain provider reimbursement data would be exempted
from disclosure under specific conditions. 89
The question of the release of information filed by Blue Cross
with the Insurance Commissioner has been the subject of protracted litigation. The Court of Appeals has ruled the BCBSM
filings are subject to the Freedom of Information Act and their
filings to date have not contained bona fide trade secrets;' 0
It is important to note that other corporations, including insurance companies, file similar kinds of information or more sensitive kinds of information, and are also subject to the Freedom
of Information Act. In the case of casualty insurers, for example:
"Every insurer shall file with the commissioner every manual of
classification, every manual of rules and rates, every rating plan
and every modification of any of the foregoing . . . . "u This information is public.
a. Competitive position- It has been alleged that release of
this information would harm the competitive position of Blue
Cross. First, it is important to look at the overall competitive
position of Blue Cross under P.A. 350. It is estimated that
BCBSM currently has about a fourteen percent competitive advantage over private insurance companies which results from
special legislative privileges such as hospital discounts and tax
exemptions. Other sections of this Act result in an improvement
in Blue Cross's advantage .
.. MlcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 15.231-.246 (Supp. 1980).
•• 1980 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 350, § 604 (codified at MlcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1604
(Mich. Legis. Serv. 1980)).
•• Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan v. Insurance Bureau Hearing Officer, Nos.
46857, 52454, 52714, 52485, slip op. at 10-13 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1981).
" MICH. COMP. LAWS § 500.2406(1) (1970).
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Second, in other cases where detailed information has been
filed by a company, other companies have not, as a rule, requested access to it. This may be because much of this information is already generally available to the Blues' competitors
through other sources, e.g., other subscribers, professional societies, other governmental bodies, other companies with which
Blue Cross contracts, et cetera. This disclosure will not substantially affect Blue Cross' competitive position. In fact, the third
party reimburser that has used the Freedom of Information Act
the most to gain information is BCBSM via requests to the Insurance Bureau on commerical health insurance policies and
rates. Court decisions have ruled the BCBS has failed to demonstrate that this information may be classified as trade secrets.'41
b. Need for information- The Act establishes explicit, objective, and detailed standards for rate approval. For the Insurance
Commissioner to make a judgment regarding the legality of the
proposed rates, or for an interested person to determine if he or
she would like to challenge the proposed rates, this information
is essential.
In summary, information established as "trade secrets" would
be exempt from disclosure, as would personal information, certain provider reimbursement data, and any other information
exempted by the Freedom of Information Act. 48 It has not been
demonstrated that disclosure of any additional information will
have a detrimental effect on either the Blues' competitive position or cost containment goals. It is an important legislative
principle, however, that records filed with the government be
available to the public, unless there is a compelling reason which
overrides the principle of public access to information.

D.

The Blues Pulled Out All the Stops - And Continue the
Fight

Throughout the legislative history of this bill, the Blues have
spared no expense to slow, stop or modify this legislation. In the
early stages of the session, the Blues made a $50 million loan to
Chrysler. Even though it has proven to be a questionable business loan, it did have the effect of taking some of the vigor out
of organized labor's agressive pro-consumer advocacy. Later in
•• Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan v. Insurance Bureau Hearing Officer, Nos.
46857, 52454, 52714, 52485, slip op. at 10-13 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 1981).
•• 1980 Mich. Pub. Acts No. 350, § 604 (codified at MlcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1604
(Mich. Legis. Serv. 1980).
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the session, when the Lansing HMO was in danger of going
bankrupt, the Blues stepped in and bought it out for $5 million.
Also, the Blues sent a letter to every Michigan bank offering deposits of Bloes funds in exchange for their subscriber business, a
rebating practice which is explicitly outlawed for commeric&l insurers under chapter 20 of the Insurance Code. During Senate
consideration, the Blues guaranteed a $3.5 million loan which allowed the new Detroit Receiving Hospital to open. Though these
decisions often benefited the public, they also served the Blues
well.
The Blues bought radio time and advertised extensively. They
bought billboards, radio and television ads, and full page newspaper ads. The newspaper advertisements directly attacked the
pending legislation. The full page advertisements were reproduced and mailed to Blues subscribers. At one point the Blues
even purchased a full page advertisement in a national weekly
news magazine. Besides these expenses, the Blues hired experts
from all over the country to testify against the pending legislation. The Blues had three people representing them at every
meeting, plus eight to fourteen support people who were present
to speak on any specific aspect of the legislation. No one has yet
volunteered information on the cost of the opposition, which
ultimately must be funded by subscribers through premium
dollars.
Against this barrage of wealth and expertise, I would bring a
group of senior citizen activists who inevitably would neutralize
the presence and testimony of the Blues' hired guns. Overall, the
seniors were more effective and believable than the hired experts
the Blues brought forward.
After three years, hundreds of hours and mountains of paper
work and amendments, H.R. 4555 became P.A. 350 of 1980. As a
token for my efforts, the bill was to take effect on April 3, 1981,
my birthday. On April 2, however, the Ingham County Circuit
Court, responding to a petition by Blue Cross to enjoin the Act,
placed a temporary restraining order against the law preventing
its enforcement until a number of questions of law and constitutionality can be answered ...
So now the arena has shifted from the Legislature to the
courts. I only hope that the courts can withstand the enormous
power and wealth which the Blues will bring to bear, and allow
this important consumer legislation to stand.

" Detroit News, Apr. 3, 1981, at 3A, col. 1.

